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Abstract
The amount of digital imagery recorded has recently grown
exponentially, and with the advancement of software, such as Pho-
toshop or Gimp, it has become easier to manipulate images. How-
ever, most images on the internet have not been manipulated and
any automated manipulation detection algorithm must carefully
control the false alarm rate. In this paper we discuss a method to
automatically detect local resampling using deep learning while
controlling the false alarm rate using a-contrario analysis. The
automated procedure consists of three primary steps. First, re-
sampling features are calculated for image blocks. A deep learn-
ing classifier is then used to generate a heatmap that indicates
if the image block has been resampled. We expect some of these
blocks to be falsely identified as resampled. We use a-contrario
hypothesis testing to both identify if the patterns of the manip-
ulated blocks indicate if the image has been tampered with and
to localize the manipulation. We demonstrate that this strategy
is effective in indicating if an image has been manipulated and
localizing the manipulations.
Introduction
Image tampering techniques have become sophisticated and
in many instances experts have difficulty identifying if an image
has been modified. Furthermore, with the advent of new cameras,
smartphones and tablets, the amount of digital images has grown
exponentially and the tools for digitally manipulating these im-
ages, such as Photoshop, Gimp, Snapseed, and Pixlr, have evolved
significantly making it easy to modify many images in a short
time span. Due to these advancements, the field of digital im-
age forensics needs to develop tools that can quickly verify im-
age authenticity and localize the regions where an image has been
manipulated. In this paper, we combine our previous works on
resampling detection [1] and a-contrario analysis [2, 3] to assign
a tamper score and localize the image tampering. We demonstrate
that our algorithm is effective at detecting many different types of
image tampering.
Many categories of image forgeries, including copy-move,
splicing, and object removal, often implement resampling as part
of the forgery workflow. Resampling is required in order to blend
the inserted or modified regions of the image with the rest of the
image. For this reason, resampling detection is capable of detect-
ing many different types of image manipulations and many resam-
pling detector have been recently proposed [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
However, all of these resampling detection techniques are not
completely accurate for certain image regions and false alarms
occur when anti-detection methods are implemented. There is a
need to carefully control the false alarm rate at the image level.
In [1] we designed a detector to improve on previous re-
sampling detectors. Our detector found image artifacts imposed
by classic upsampled, downsampled, clockwise rotation, counter-
clockwise rotation, and shearing methods. We combined these
five different resampling detectors with a JPEG compression de-
tector and for each of the six detectors we output a heatmap cor-
responding to a confidence score of where the image was manip-
ulated. We observed in our previous work that our heatmaps were
noisy, and in [1] we smoothed the heatmaps to localize the detec-
tion and determine the detection score. In this work, motivated
by [2, 3], we develop a new detection scheme that combines two
ideas:a-contrario statistical hypothesis testing and image segmen-
tation.
The a- contrario methodology was originally formulated by
Desolneux, Moison, and Morel in order to rigorously implement
the Helmholt Theroy of perception[11]. Motivated by the lack of
principled methods to determine an appropriate decision thresh-
old for many basic computer vision tasks they formulated a struc-
tured statistical test to detect image primitives such as line seg-
ments and contrasted boundaries.
We were inspired to use the a-contrario procedure since it
only requires a model, the background model, for unstructured
data, i.e. heatmaps in which no resampling has occurred, and we
do not need to postulate a model for heatmaps that indicate resam-
poing has occurred. Our procedure starts by scanning the heatmap
for all possible detection events, where a detection event is a lo-
cation in the heatmap plus a group of pixels within the heatmap
that makes it a valid detection. Since the background model is the
model for unstructured data, then any detection within the event
set is a false detection according to the a-contrario model and the
goal of a-contrario modeling is to provide an upper bound on the
number of these false detections.
Previous Work
The image forensics field recognizes many different cate-
gories of image forgeries with copy-move, splicing, and object
removal as some of the most popular. In many of these forgeries,
resampling is a necessary workflow element. Due to the diver-
sity of image tampering methods, there are numerous techniques
to identify if an image has been manipulated and we briefly re-
view some of the techniques below with a special emphasis on
those that overlap with our method. We then review a-contrario
analysis.
Resampling and Image Forgery Detection
Resampling an image requires an interpolation method and
linear or cubic interpolations are very popular and this fact was ex-
ploited by the authors of [4]. They implemented an Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm to detect periodic correlations in-
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troduced by interpolation. However the periodic JPEG blocking
artifacts also introduce periodic patterns that confuses their re-
sampling detector. The variance of the second difference operator
was used by [6] to detect resampling on images that are scaled us-
ing linear or cubic interpolations. Their method is most efficient
at detecting up-scaling and it is very robust to JPEG compres-
sion with detection possible even at very low quality factors (QF).
Downscaled images can be detected but not as robustly as up-
scaled images. In [7], the Radon transform and a derivative filter
was exploited to improved the quality of the results and to address
other forms of resampling. In [8], a simpler method than [4] was
derived by using a linear predictor residue instead of the computa-
tionally expensive EM algorithm. This resampling body of work
motivated us in [1] where we combined the linear predictor strat-
egy with deep learning based models in order to detect tampered
image patches.
Other resampling detectors include [10, 12, 13, 14, 9, 15,
16]. In [10] periodic properties of interpolation were found us-
ing the second-derivative of the image and these properties were
used for detecting image manipulation. Resampling on JPEG
compressed images was detected in [12, 13] by added noise be-
fore passing the image through the resampling detector and they
showed that adding noise improved resampling detection. A nor-
malized energy feature was implemented in [14, 9] and a support
vector machine (SVM) was subsequently used to classify resam-
pled images. Furthermore, recent approaches to reduce the effects
of JPEG artifacts were developed in [15, 16].
We tested our resampling detector on a broad range of gen-
eral image tampering techniques. Most image tamper detection
strategies are directed toward a specific type of image forgery
such as copy-move or object insertions and removals and we re-
view some common approaches. For copy-move forgeries a com-
mon approach is to match image features within the image. In
order to detect copy-move forgeries, an image is first divided into
overlapping blocks and some sort of distance measure or corre-
lation is used to determine blocks that have been cloned. For
example, in [17] copy-move forgeries were detected using SIFT
features. Many similar methods to detect copy-move have been
proposed [18, 19, 20, 21].
Another strategy to detect copy move forgeries is to match a
transformation of image regions rather than image regions them-
selves. In [22], Fridrich et. al use DCT coefficients of image re-
gions to help find duplicate DCT blocks while Popsecu and Farid
used PCA [23] to detect duplicated regions and Mahdian and Saic
use a combination of blur invariant moments and PCA [24]. A
matching image regions to detect copy-move forgeries becomes
more difficult if the moved region undergoes some transformation
such as scalings that makes region matching difficult. Bayram
et. al [25] addresses this issue by using a combination of Fourier
Mellin transforms, which are invariant to rotation, scale and trans-
lation, and Bloom filters. Another issue in locating copy-move
forgeries is the computational time to find matching patches. In
[26], the patch-match algorithm is used to efficiently compute an
approximate nearest neighbor field over an image. They added
robustness to their algorithm by using invariant features such as
Circular Harmonic transforms and show that they can detect du-
plicated blocks that have undergone geometrical transformations
and then perform keypoint matching.
In [27], an image splicing detection technique has been pro-
posed using visual artifacts. A novel image forgery detection
method is presented in [28] based on the steerable pyramid trans-
form (SPT) and local binary pattern (LBP). The paper [29] in-
cludes the recent advances in image manipulation and discusses
the process of restoring missing or damaged areas in an image.
In [30], the authors review the different image forgery detection
techniques in image forensic literature.
In computer vision, deep learning shows outstanding perfor-
mance in different visual recognition tasks such as image classi-
fication [31], and semantic segmentation [32]. For this reason,
there has been a growing interest to detect image manipulation
by applying different computer vision and deep-learning algo-
rithms [33, 34, 35, 36]. In [32], two fully convolution layers have
been exploited to segment different objects in an image. The seg-
mentation task has been further improved in [37, 38]. These mod-
els extract hierarchical features to represent the visual concept,
which is useful in object segmentation. Since, the manipulation
does not exhibit any visual change with respect to genuine im-
ages, these models often do not perform well in segmenting ma-
nipulated regions.
Other deep learning methods include detection of generic
manipulations [33, 34], resampling [39], splicing [35] and boot-
leg [40]. In [41] the authors propose Gaussian-Neuron CNN
(GNCNN) for steganalysis detection. A deep learning approach
to identify facial retouching was proposed in [42]. In [43], im-
age region forgery detection has been performed using a stacked
auto-encoder model. In[33], a new constrained convolutional
layer is proposed to learn the manipulated features from an im-
age. In [1] an unique network exploiting convolution layers along
with LSTM network was presented.
A-Contrario Analysis
Our approach to determining an image manipulation score
and localizing manipulated regions is motivated by a-contrario
change detection algorithms. Many change detection algorithms
propose to find differences between two images by registering the
two images and then finding the magnitude of the difference be-
tween the two images. Registration error plus illumination dif-
ferences introduce mistakes in such change detection algorithms,
and thus controlling false alarms are a priority. In this work, we
replace the difference between the two images with a heatmap
generated using our resampling detector. Since our procedure is
a modified change detection algorithm, we review the different a-
contrario change detection methods. Furthermore, for simplicity
of discussion and to tie in with this work, we refer to the image
difference in the change detection algorithms as a heatmap.
A-contrario methods were popularized in image processing
by Desolneux, Moisan and Morel, and this procedure was ini-
tially applied to identifying edges, alignments, one dimensional
histogram modes, and highly contrasted boundaries [44, 45, 46,
47, 48, 11]. Many problems have been addressed using the a-
contrario methods other than change detection. These applica-
tions include, but are not limited to, automated color segmen-
tation [49], mode detection of two dimensional histograms [2],
change detection [3], clustering [50], and matching local features
[51]. Fundamental to a-contrario methods is the identification of
a background probability model H0, a set of detection events E ,
and a multiple hypothesis testing procedure that bounds the num-
ber of false alarms.
The earliest work on a-contrario methods for change detec-
tion is by Lisani and Morel [52] where they use the binomial dis-
tribution as the background model and a sliding window to de-
termine events. Their method is sensitive to the the window size
and cannot locate changes of arbitrary shapes. The adapted win-
dows technique of Dibos et al. [53] uses a-contrario methods
to detect changes in moving video. They are interested in real
time processing, and therefore they use a sliding window method.
The use of sliding windows reduces processing time, but it also
has less precise boundary information. Veit et al. [54] used the
a-contrario methods with the binomial distribution as the back-
ground model and level sets with highly contrasted boundaries
to determine possible events. Using contrasted boundaries allows
one to find arbitrary shapes in the image, but the number of events
is limited. The a-contrario method in [3] is built on these ideas but
used every possible image level set to determine the set of events.
The paper by Buades et al. also explores using the a-contrario
methods for change detection applications [55]. They also use
sliding windows and histogram analysis is used to determine the
heatmap.
Figure 1. The algorithm workflow. First, a heatmap that indicates resam-
pling is generated using the deep learning models in Figure 2. A-contrario
analysis, illustrated in the last two images, is then used to localize the resam-
pling and determine a total image score.
Methods and Results
Our procedure to determine manipulated regions consists of
two primary steps summarized in Fig. 1. First, a neural net clas-
sifier is applied to resampling features to determined six different
heatmaps. The heatmap generation was first reported in [1] and
we leave the details of the computations to that paper. Second, a-
contrario analysis is applied to each heatmap and an image score
is obtained using information from all the heatmaps. The com-
plete a-contrario algorithm is given in [2] and only an outline of
the algorithm will be presented here.
Resampling Heatmap Generation
Our initial step is to generate heatmaps that indicate the five
different resamplings required for upsampling, downsampling,
shearing, clockwise rotation and counterclockwise rotation. Fur-
thermore, we included a JPEG compression classifier that deter-
mines if the input has been compress at a JPEG quality factor of
85 or less. The five resampling and one JPEG classifier gener-
ates six different heatmaps. In order to train our six heatmaps we
use two different procedures. The first procedure is to extract re-
sampling features from the image and use a deep convolutional
neural network to train a classifier on these features. The second
procedure is to train a classifier on the image itself and Fig. 3
summarizes the two procedures labeled model I and model II. In
particular, we use model I for rescaling down, rotate clockwise,
rotate counterclockwise, and shearing while model II was used
for rescaling up and jpeg quality detection. We chose the model
by training both models for all manipulation types and picking the
model that gave the best area under the curve (AUC) value on a
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve.
In order to localize the manipulations, we do not train the
classifiers on the entire image, but rather train the classifiers on
64x64 image patches. In order to generate features we apply a
3x3 Laplacian filter to these patches and output the linear pre-
dictive error magnitude of the patches. Correlations in the linear
predictor error are then found using the Radon transform followed
by a 2-D FFT. We trained the classifiers using uncompressed im-
ages from the UCID dataset [56] and RAISE data set [57] where
we simulated the different resampling methods and JPEG com-
pression. Both data sets were disjoint from our final testing data
set. Note that the classifiers are not mutually exclusive and we did
not use a multiclass model but trained each classifier separately.
More details about patch size selection and algorithm design can
be found in [1]. Note that since the classifier classifies image
blocks with a pixel stride of nine the resulting heatmap’s width
and height is smaller than the original image.
Tamper Score and Mask determination using a-
contrario analysis
Once the heatmap is generated, a-contrario analysis is used
to simultaneously determine an image score and to localize the
tamper areas. This procedure requires a background probability
model for when no tampering occurs, which we will callH0, a set
of possible manipulation events E , and a decision function based
on the background model whose domain are the events.
Recall that the model H0 serves as a model when no struc-
ture exists within the data, and the set of detection events are pos-
sible locations and grouping that correspond to data structures.
For example, in line segment detection, locations are every pixel
in the image and structures are straight lines in the image. Given
any event E ∈ E , we can calculate the probability of E occurring
under the hypothesis H0. Given any probability threshold, we
should expect to find false alarms. The definition of meaningful
events bounds the expected number of false alarms by the number
one:
Definition: Given a probability model H0, the events in E are
called meaningful events if the H0-expected number of events
observed is less than or equal to one.
Note that the cardinality of E can be large, so this technique
must correct for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, due to the
Figure 2. Patch Feature Extraction based on the Radon Transform
Figure 3. Deep Neural networks for detecting resampling in small patches.
large number of event calculations required in a typical applica-
tions, it is common to use a large deviation bound in computations
and we used the Ho¨ffding bound for Bernoulli random variables
in our work [58].
The a-contrario procedure has two inputs. The first input is
one of the six heatmaps where each tested image block is mapped
to a tampering confidence score between zero and one where one
means high confidence that the image was manipulated. Let M
indicate this mask. The second input is the original image I. The
a-contrario procedure thresholds the original mask M to create a
binary 0-1 mask and then refines the mask using region proposals
derived from the original image. Let T M be the mask after apply-
ing the threshold. Two region proposals were used in the analysis:
level set and deep mask proposals. Given the two inputs, the ini-
Figure 4. Example results of the a-contrario segmentation.
tial step is to threshold the heatmap resulting in a binary mask of
zeros and ones with one indicating the block was tampered. We
then assume a Bernouilli model where p is the probability of a
heatmap pixel is one. The value of p is determined by counting
the number of pixels in the heatmap that are one and dividing by
the total number of pixels. In other words, in order to determine
if a set is spatially grouped, we assume that the pixels of T M are
uniformly distributed on the image and look for regions that do
not agree with that hypothesis. This forms our background model
H0
Given this binary mask, we assume tampering occurs when
pixels in T M cluster spatially. Ideally, we would search every
possible connected group of pixels to find clusters of manipulated
patches, but this is computationally in-feasible. We therefore use
the fast level set transform [59] and deep mask [60] to segment
the image image. The output of deepmask is a set of connected
pixels that correspond to a semantically segmented object in the
image. The output of the fast level set transform is a connected
region where the boundary of the region has constant pixel value.
We use both methods since deepmask is not trained on all possible
regions that we may want to segment, therefore just using deep-
mask results in missed detection, and the fast level set transform
will not always find semantically reasonable regions.
The segmented image regions are used to limit the number of
connected regions required to search. An event in E is therefore
the region determined by the image together with the count of
pixels that are one and the count of pixels that are zero inside the
these regions.
Figure 5. ROC curve for a-contrario analysis on the right compared with
the method in [1] on the left.
Data: Resampling Heatmap M, Original Image I
Result: Segmented Image
{S}← FLST (I)∪DeepMask(I)
T M←M > c
L← empty list.
forall S ∈ {S} do
r(S) = ∑(i, j)∈S T M(i, j)
NFA(S) = #S Pr(R > r(s))
if NFA(S)< 1 then
L.append(S)
end
end
Cull L to a list of disjoint sets.
Output L.
Algorithm 1: Pseuodocode to generate a score and mask from
each heatmap.
Let S be a region proposal, i.e. a segmented region of the
image, obtained either through the level set analysis or through
the deep mask algorithm. We use a Bernoulli process to de-
termine if the region has been tampered by counting the num-
ber of tampered blocks within the region using the formula
r(S) = ∑(i, j)∈S T M(i, j). We then calculate the decision func-
tion NFA(S) = #SPr(R > r(s)) where #S is the total number of
region proposals and the probability is the tail of the binomial
distribution with probability of success p. Note that NFA(S)
stands for the number of false alarms and using the a− contrario
model all meaningful events are unlikely to occur due to chance
since NFA(S) is an upper bound on the expected number of false
alarms. Each meaningful region satisfies NFA(S) < 1 and is
flagged as a potentially manipulated region. The regions are then
further refined by determining a disjoint set of regions that have
the minimal NFA(S) values. See [3] for a discussion on how to
obtain the disjoint regions.
Following this procedure, a score and heatmap is generated
for each of the six heatmaps creating a six dimensional vector
with each element between zero and one. A final image score was
derived by averaging the non-zero elements of this vector. If all
the elements were zero, the output score was zero. The final mask
is the union of the masks obtained from the non-zero elements.
Example mask results are shown in Fig. 4.
We evaluated the proposed model on NIST Nimble 2017
dataset for the Media Forensics challenge. This dataset includes
mainly three types of manipulation: (a) copy-clone, (b) removal,
and (c) splicing. The images are tampered in a sophisticated way
to beat current state-of-the-art detection techniques. The results in
Fig. 5 show the efficacy of the proposed model for different im-
ages in Nimble 2016 dataset. Compared with the results from [1],
where the same feature set was used but a different image scoring
method was implemented, the area under the curve metric on the
ROC curve increased by .08 using the a-contrario method.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we described a technique to determine and im-
age tamper score and a mask using resamping features, deep neu-
ral networks, and a-contrario analysis. We demonstrated that the
a-contrario procedure can increase the AUC measurement over
previous work. We note that the a-contario procedure is applica-
ble to all heatmaps bounded between zero and one and does not
require the resampling heatmaps presented in this paper.
There is room to improve the a-contrario procedure pre-
sented here through parameter tuning and better integration of
the output scores from the heatmaps. In particular, we applied
a threshold to the heatmaps using a value of 0.75 and did not at-
tempt to optimize this threshold. Furthermore, we used a simple
mean value to combine the information from the heatmaps. As
mentioned above, the heatmaps are not independent and a more
careful statistical analysis should obtain a better final output score.
Acknowledgments
This research was developed with funding from the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The views, opin-
ions and/or findings expressed are those of the author and should
not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of
the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The paper is
approved for public release, distribution unlimited.
References
[1] J. Bunk, J. H. Bappy, T. M. Mohammed, et al., “Detection and lo-
calization of image forgeries using resampling features and deep
learning,” in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops
(CVPRW), 2017 IEEE Conference on, 1881–1889, IEEE (2017).
[2] A. Flenner, G. A. Hewer, and C. S. Kenney, “Two dimensional his-
togram analysis using the helmholtz principle,” Inverse Problems &
Imaging 2(4), 485–525 (2008).
[3] A. Flenner and G. Hewer, “A helmholtz principle approach to pa-
rameter free change detection and coherent motion using exchange-
able random variables,” SIAM Journal on Imaging Sciences 4(1),
243–276 (2011).
[4] A. C. Popescu and H. Farid, “Exposing digital forgeries by detect-
ing traces of resampling,” IEEE Transactions on signal processing
53(2), 758–767 (2005).
[5] S. Prasad and K. Ramakrishnan, “On resampling detection and its
application to detect image tampering,” in 2006 IEEE International
Conference on Multimedia and Expo, 1325–1328, IEEE (2006).
[6] A. Gallagher, “Detection of linear and cubic interpolation in JPEG
compressed images,” in Computer and Robot Vision, 2005. Proc.
The 2nd Canadian Conference on, 65–72 (2005).
[7] B. Mahdian and S. Saic, “Blind authentication using periodic prop-
erties of interpolation,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on 3, 529–538 (2008).
[8] M. Kirchner, “On the detectability of local resampling in digital
images,” Security, Forensics, Steganography, and Watermarking of
Multimedia Contents X 6819(1), 68190F, SPIE (2008).
[9] X. Feng, I. J. Cox, and G. Doerr, “Normalized energy density-
based forensic detection of resampled images,” IEEE Transactions
on Multimedia 14(3), 536–545 (2012).
[10] S.-J. Ryu and H.-K. Lee, “Estimation of linear transformation by an-
alyzing the periodicity of interpolation,” Pattern Recognition Letters
36, 89–99 (2014).
[11] A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, and J. Morel, “Meaningful alignments,”
Int. J. of Comput. Vision 40(1), 7–23 (2000).
[12] L. Nataraj, A. Sarkar, and B. S. Manjunath, “Improving re-sampling
detection by adding noise,” in SPIE, Media Forensics and Security,
7541 (2010).
[13] L. Nataraj, A. Sarkar, and B. S. Manjunath, “Adding gaussian noise
to “denoise” JPEG for detecting image resizing,” in ICIP, (2009).
[14] X. Feng, I. J. Cox, and G. Doe¨rr, “An energy-based method for the
forensic detection of re-sampled images,” in Multimedia and Expo
(ICME), 2011 IEEE International Conference on, 1–6, IEEE (2011).
[15] S. A. Golestaneh and D. M. Chandler, “Algorithm for jpeg artifact
reduction via local edge regeneration,” Journal of Electronic Imag-
ing 23(1), 013018–013018 (2014).
[16] Y. Kwon, K. I. Kim, J. Tompkin, et al., “Efficient learning of image
super-resolution and compression artifact removal with semi-local
gaussian processes,” IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and ma-
chine intelligence 37(9), 1792–1805 (2015).
[17] I. Amerini, L. Ballan, R. Caldelli, et al., “A sift-based forensic
method for copy–move attack detection and transformation recov-
ery,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 6(3),
1099–1110 (2011).
[18] J. Li, X. Li, B. Yang, et al., “Segmentation-based image copy-
move forgery detection scheme,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 10(3), 507–518 (2015).
[19] P. Kakar and N. Sudha, “Exposing postprocessed copy–paste forg-
eries through transform-invariant features,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security 7(3), 1018–1028 (2012).
[20] M. Jaberi, G. Bebis, M. Hussain, et al., “Accurate and robust local-
ization of duplicated region in copy–move image forgery,” Machine
vision and applications 25(2), 451–475 (2014).
[21] O. M. Al-Qershi and B. E. Khoo, “Passive detection of copy-move
forgery in digital images: State-of-the-art,” Forensic science inter-
national 231(1), 284–295 (2013).
[22] A. J. Fridrich, B. D. Soukal, and A. J. Luka´sˇ, “Detection of copy-
move forgery in digital images,” in in Proceedings of Digital Foren-
sic Research Workshop, Citeseer (2003).
[23] A. C. Popescu and H. Farid, “Exposing digital forgeries by detecting
duplicated image regions,” Tech. Rep. TR2004-515, Department of
Computer Science, Dartmouth College (2004).
[24] B. Mahdian and S. Saic, “Detection of copy–move forgery using a
method based on blur moment invariants,” Forensic science interna-
tional 171(2), 180–189 (2007).
[25] S. Bayram, H. T. Sencar, and N. Memon, “An efficient and robust
method for detecting copy-move forgery,” in Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing, 2009. ICASSP 2009. IEEE International Confer-
ence on, 1053–1056, IEEE (2009).
[26] D. Cozzolino, G. Poggi, and L. Verdoliva, “Efficient dense-field
copy–move forgery detection,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 10(11), 2284–2297 (2015).
[27] V. Manu and B. Mehtre, “Visual artifacts based image splicing de-
tection in uncompressed images,” in Computer Graphics, Vision and
Information Security (CGVIS), 2015 IEEE International Conference
on, 145–150 (2015).
[28] G. Muhammad, M. H. Al-Hammadi, M. Hussain, et al., “Image
forgery detection using steerable pyramid transform and local binary
pattern,” Machine Vision and Applications 25(4), 985–995 (2014).
[29] C. Guillemot and O. Le Meur, “Image inpainting: Overview and
recent advances,” IEEE signal processing magazine 31(1), 127–144
(2014).
[30] M. D. Ansari, S. P. Ghrera, and V. Tyagi, “Pixel-based image
forgery detection: A review,” IETE journal of education 55(1), 40–
46 (2014).
[31] B. Zhou, A. Lapedriza, J. Xiao, et al., “Learning deep features for
scene recognition using places database,” in Advances in neural in-
formation processing systems, 487–495 (2014).
[32] J. Long, E. Shelhamer, and T. Darrell, “Fully convolutional networks
for semantic segmentation,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 3431–3440 (2015).
[33] B. Bayar and M. C. Stamm, “A deep learning approach to universal
image manipulation detection using a new convolutional layer,” in
Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and
Multimedia Security, 5–10 (2016).
[34] B. Bayar and M. C. Stamm, “Design principles of convolutional
neural networks for multimedia forensics,” in The 2017 IS&T Inter-
national Symposium on Electronic Imaging: Media Watermarking,
Security, and Forensics, IS&T Electronic Imaging (2017).
[35] Y. Rao and J. Ni, “A deep learning approach to detection of splicing
and copy-move forgeries in images,” in Information Forensics and
Security (WIFS), 2016 IEEE International Workshop on, 1–6, IEEE
(2016).
[36] J. H. Bappy, A. K. Roy-Chowdhury, J. Bunk, et al., “Exploiting
spatial structure for localizing manipulated image regions,” in Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision,
(2017).
[37] S. Zheng, S. Jayasumana, B. Romera-Paredes, et al., “Conditional
random fields as recurrent neural networks,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision, 1529–1537
(2015).
[38] V. Badrinarayanan, A. Kendall, and R. Cipolla, “Segnet: A deep
convolutional encoder-decoder architecture for scene segmenta-
tion,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intel-
ligence 39(12) (2017).
[39] B. Bayar and M. C. Stamm, “On the robustness of constrained
convolutional neural networks to jpeg post-compression for image
resampling detection,” in Proceedings of The 42nd IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing,
IEEE (2017).
[40] M. Buccoli, P. Bestagini, M. Zanoni, et al., “Unsupervised feature
learning for bootleg detection using deep learning architectures,”
in Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2014 IEEE Interna-
tional Workshop on, 131–136, IEEE (2014).
[41] Y. Qian, J. Dong, W. Wang, et al., “Deep learning for steganalysis
via convolutional neural networks,” in SPIE/IS&T Electronic Imag-
ing, International Society for Optics and Photonics (2015).
[42] A. Bharati, R. Singh, M. Vatsa, et al., “Detecting facial retouching
using supervised deep learning,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 11(9), 1903–1913 (2016).
[43] Y. Zhang, L. L. Win, J. Goh, et al., “Image region forgery detec-
tion: A deep learning approach,” in Proceedings of the Singapore
Cyber-Security Conference (SG-CRC) 2016: Cyber-Security by De-
sign, 14, 1 (2016).
[44] A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, and J. Morel, From gestalt theory to image
analysis: a probabilistic approach, Springer Verlag (2007).
[45] A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, and J. M. Morel, “Edge detection by
Helmholtz principle,” Journal of Mathematical Imaging and Vision
14, 271–284 (2001).
[46] A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, and J. M. Morel, “Computational gestalts
and perception thresholds.,” J. Physiol Paris 97(2-3), 311–324
(2003).
[47] A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, and J. M. Morel, “Maximal meaningful
events and applications to image analysis,” Ann. of Statist. 31(6),
1822–1851 (2003).
[48] A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, and J. M. Morel, “A grouping principle
and four applications,” IEEE Trans. on Pattern Analy. and Mach.
Intell. 26, 1105–1111 (2004).
[49] J. Delon, A. Desolneux, J. L. Lisani, et al., “Automatic color
palette,” Inverse Probl. and Imaging 1(2), 265–287 (2007).
[50] P. Muse´, F. Sur, F. Cao, et al., “An a contrario decision method for
shape element recognition,” Int. J. Comput. Vision 69(5), 860–872
(2006).
[51] A. Rabin, J. Delon, and Y. Gousseau, “A statistical approach to the
matching of local features,” SIAM J. Imaging Sciences 2(3), 931–
958 (2009).
[52] J. L. Lisani and J. M. Morel, “Detection of major changes in satellite
images,” Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Image Processing 1, 941–943
(2003).
[53] F. Dibos, G. Koepfler, and S. Pelletier, “Adapted windows detection
of moving objects in video scenes,” SIAM J. Imaging Sciences 2(1)
(2009).
[54] T. Veit, F. Cao, and P. Bouthemy, “An a contrario decision frame-
work for region-based motion detection,” Int. J. of Comput. Vision
68(2), 163–178 (2006).
[55] A. Buades, J. Lisani, and L. Rudin, “Adaptive change dectection,”
Systems, Signals and Image Processing - IWSSIP 2009 1, 1–4
(2009).
[56] G. Schaefer and M. Stich, “Ucid: An uncompressed color image
database,” in Electronic Imaging 2004, 472–480, International So-
ciety for Optics and Photonics (2003).
[57] D.-T. Dang-Nguyen, C. Pasquini, V. Conotter, et al., “Raise: a raw
images dataset for digital image forensics,” in Proceedings of the 6th
ACM Multimedia Systems Conference, 219–224, ACM (2015).
[58] W. Hoeffding, “Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random
variables,” Journal of the American statistical association 58(301),
13–30 (1963).
[59] P. Monasse and F. Guichard, “Fast computation of a contrast-
invariant image representation,” IEEE Transactions on Image Pro-
cessing 9(5), 860–872 (2000).
[60] P. O. Pinheiro, R. Collobert, and P. Dolla´r, “Learning to segment
object candidates,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, 1990–1998 (2015).
Author Biography
Dr. Arjuna Flenner received his Ph.D. in Physics at the
University of Missouri-Columbia located in Columbia MO in the
year 2004. His major emphasis was mathematical Physics. After
obtaining his Ph.D., Arjuna Flenner obtained a job as a research
physicist for NAVAIR at China Lake CA. He won the 2013 Dr.
Delores M. Etter Navy Scientist and Engineer award for his work
on Machine Learning.
Lawrence A. Peterson has extensive research and develop-
ment experience as a civilian engineer / scientist with the U. S.
Navy for over 37 years. He currently heads the Image and Signal
Processing Branch in the Physics and Computational Sciences
Division, Research Directorate at the Naval Air Warfare Cen-
ter, Weapons Division (NAWCWD), China Lake, CA. Additional
development experience includes signals and imagery exploita-
tion, multi-modal target detection and integrated guidance appli-
cations, software development for radar and ESM systems, IR/EO
and RF propagation modeling and simulation.
Jason Bunk received his B.S. degree Computational Physics
from the University of California, San Diego in 2015, and the M.S.
degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the Univer-
sity of California, Santa Barbara in 2016. He is currently a Re-
search Staff Member at Mayachitra Inc., Santa Barbara, CA. His
recent research efforts include applying deep learning techniques
to media forensics, and active learning with neural networks for
video activity recognition.
Tajuddin Manhar Mohammed received his B.Tech (Hons)
degree in Electrical Engineering from Indian Institute of Tech-
nology (IIT), Hyderabad, India in 2015 and his M.S. degree in
Electrical and Computer Engineering from University of Califor-
nia Santa Barbara (UCSB), Santa Barbara, CA in 2016. After
obtaining his Masters degree, Tajuddin Manhar Mohammed ob-
tained a job as a Research Staff Member for Mayachitra Inc.,
Santa Barbara, CA. His recent research efforts include developing
deep learning and computer vision techniques for image forensics
and cyber security.
Lakshmanan Nataraj recieved his B.E degree in Electronics
and Communications Engineering from Anna university in 2007,
and the Ph.D. degree in the Electrical and Computer Engineering
from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2015. He
is currently a Research Staff Member at Mayachitra Inc., Santa
Barbara, CA. His research interests include malware analysis and
image forensics.
B. S. Manjunath (F05) received the Ph.D. degree in electri-
cal engineering from the University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, CA, USA, in 1991. He is currently a Professor of Electri-
cal and Computer Engineering with the University of California
at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, where he directs the
Center for Multi-Modal Big Data Science and Healthcare. He has
authored or co-authored about 300 peer-reviewed articles. He is
a Co-Editor of the book entitled Introduction to MPEG-7 (New
York: Wiley, 2002). His current research interests include im-
age processing, computer vision, biomedical image analysis, and
large-scale multimedia databases.
